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ABSTRACT
The existence and exploitation of buyer power is emerging as an
important concern for antitrust as the public enforcement of antitrust law
itself is re-emerging as part of the renewed recognition that markets
require rules in order to operate efficiently and in socially desirable ways.
Buyer cartels are per se illegal but buying groups are subject to the "rule
of reason" in antitrust law; yet, the two types of activity are hard to
distinguish in a variety of circumstances. Moreover, neither courts nor
commentators have provided very satisfactory explanations and
justifications for the "per se'" and "rule of reason" results. Indeed, in
some circumstances, commentators and an occasional court have argued
that buyers should be allowed to collude together simply to fix prices or
allocate inputs. Conversely, many courts and commentators seem unaware
of the potential risks that apparently legitimate buying groups can pose to
the competitive process. The goal of this Article is to explicate, evaluate,
and critique the differences between buyer cartels and buying groups and
the resulting antitrust liability rules. First, effective policy must identify
the factors both internal to such a group as well as the external market
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conditions that justify alternative characterization of the entity. Second,
empirical studies and reported cases both demonstrate that buyer power
arises from much smaller market shares than is usually associated with
seller power. Third, the economic incentives of buyer cartels require
modification of the standard predictions that antitrust law uses to
facilitate the inference of agreement. Fourth, and finally, legitimate
buying groups, although efficient responses to the needs of their
participants, can also pose real threats to the long-term competitiveness of
both the supply and demand sides of the market.
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INTRODUCTION
It is a felony, as well as a basis for treble damage liability, for buyers
to agree on what they will pay for goods or services that they buy, or that
they will not bid against each other for particular items at an auction.
1
While not yet charged as felonies, agreements or understandings among
competitors on pay levels for employees and agreements not to raid each
other's workforce are also violations of antitrust law.2 At the same time,
the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division has stated publicly that it
will not object to the creation of "buying groups" that represent up to 35
percent of the total volume of purchases in particular markets. 3 A buying
1. See, e.g., United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944); Swift &
Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232
F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Romer, 148 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 1998); Reid
Bros. Logging Co. v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 699 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1983). A common
form of an auction bidding agreement is that the participants agree on who will buy at the
auction and then among themselves have a second auction to allocate the goods among
the participants. For a detailed description of a bidding ring, see John Asker, A Study of
the Internal Organization of a Bidding Cartel, AM. ECON. REv. (forthcoming), available
at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/-jasker/stamps070628.pdf This second auction theoretically
ensures that the item goes to the buyer with the highest value and so ensures that the
overall transaction (initial sale to final owner) efficiently allocates the item to the highest
valuing buyer. But Asker's study suggests that in practice this is unlikely to occur. Id. In
any event, even in theory, such a system does not confer on the original owner the value
that the item had for the ultimate buyer. Hence, these bidding rings defeat the efficiency
purpose of the auction itself and over time would discourage rational sellers from using
such environments and instead seek alternatives, even if more costly and less efficient.
Even though this is abuse of the competitive process, there could be a question of
whether the conduct constitutes antitrust injury because it does not directly reduce output.
The only direct effect is to redistribute the economic rents associated with the transaction.
2. See, e.g., Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding treble-
damages in class action complaint charging a conspiracy to stabilize wage rates for
various classes of technical workers at major oil and gas companies); Fleischman v.
Albany Med. Ctr., No. 1:06-CV-165, 2008 WL 2945993, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. July 28, 2008);
Del. Health Care, Inc. v. MCD Holding Co., 893 F. Supp. 1279 (D. Del. 1995) (hospital
collusion on nurses); cf. All Care Nursing Serv., Inc. v. High Tech Staffing Servs., Inc.,
135 F.3d 740 (1 1th Cir. 1998) (rejecting per se treatment of agreement among hospitals
to restrict competition for nurses). In 2009, a government investigation was commenced
to examine alleged agreements among major internet and software companies that they
would not seek to hire each other's workers. See Cecilia Kang, Federal Antitrust Probe
Targets Tech Giants, Sources Say, WASH. POST, June 3, 2009, at A16, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/02/AR2009060 2 03 412.
html; see also Steve Johnson, Elise Ackerman & Sue McAllister, Google Recruiter:
Company Kept 'do not touch' in Hiring List, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 3, 2009.
3. See Mark J. Botti, Observations on and from the Antitrust Division's Buyer-Side
Cases: How Can "Lower" Prices Violate the Antitrust Laws? (Paper presented at the
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group, like the bidders at an auction, brings together a set of potentially
competing buyers that pool their purchases and act together to negotiate
prices for the inputs they seek even if the products so obtained will be
shipped directly to each buyer and billed separately.
4
Hence, as an initial matter, it may seem difficult to distinguish
between the buyers at an auction who act collectively to decide on who
and what they will pay for items, and a group of hospitals that pool their
purchases and demand lower prices in return for the volume they offer.5
Yet, the auction-buying ring (cartel) is generally held to be illegal "per se"
and a felony, while the buying group is subject to a "rule of reason" that
currently entails a strong presumption of legality.
6
What differentiates these situations is both the functional and legal
characterization of the entity doing the buying. However, contemporary
explanations and justifications for the "per se" and "rule of reason" results
are not very satisfactorily explicated by either courts or commentators.7
Moreover, the distinction between these two types of buying activities is
not always easily applied. Indeed, a nominally lawful buying group can
become a cartel akin to the auction conspiracy. 8 Conversely, a group of
bidders at an auction might lawfully collaborate together to create a better
(i.e., higher) bid for an item than any one individual bidder could offer.
9
2007 ABA Antitrust Section meeting, Apr. 19, 2007), available at http://www.abanet.org
/antitrust/at-committees/at-hcic/pdffprogram-papers/Botti-Paper.pdf.
4. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to High Technology
Competition, 44 WM. & M. L. REv. 65, 142-43 (2002); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A
Proposed Antitrust Approach to Buyers' Competitive Conduct, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1121,
1151 n. 139 (2005) [hereinafter Piraino, Buyers' Competitive Conduct].
5. See Barry Meier & Mary Williams Walsh, Senate Panel Criticizes Hospital
Buying Groups, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2002, at Cl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2002/05/01/business/senate-panel-criticizes-hospital-buying-groups.html.
6. See, e.g., Nw. Wholesale Stationers v. Pac. Stationery & Printing, 472 U.S. 284,
297-98 (1985); see also Jonathan M. Jacobson & Gary J. Dorman, Joint Purchasing,
Monopsony and Antitrust, 36 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 4 (1991) (arguing that joint purchasing
should be treated more leniently than joint ventures among sellers).
7. See, e.g., James Murphy Dowd, Oligopsony Power: Antitrust Injury and Collusive
Buyer Practices in Input Markets, 76 B.U. L. REv. 1075, 1094-1103 (1996).
8. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 606 (7th
Cir. 1997).
9. The use ofjoint bidding is seen frequently in construction and highway contracting
where the buyer allows sellers to collaborate. Cf Antonio Estache & Atsushi limi, Joint
Bidding in Infrastructure Procurement (World Bank, Policy Research, Working Paper
No. WPS 4664), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1232760. On the buying side,
whenever the things being sold are sold in a bundle, there is a plausible basis for a joint
buying agreement in order to allow the most efficient use of the goods by combining the
highest value a set of buyers would give for each component of the bundle. This can
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Moreover, in some circumstances, commentators and an occasional court
have argued that buyers should be allowed to collude together simply to
fix prices or allocate inputs.' 0 Conversely, many courts and commentators
seem unaware of the potential risks that apparently legitimate buying
groups can pose to the competitive process.
The goal of this Article is to explicate, evaluate, and critique the
differences between buyer cartels and buying groups and the resulting
antitrust liability rules. First, it is important to appreciate the continuum of
functions that a buying group can pursue and the implications of those
functions for the competitive process.'1 Hence, effective policy must
identify the factors both internal to such a group, as well as the external
market conditions that justify alternative characterization of the entity.
Second, empirical studies and reported cases both demonstrate that
buyer power arises from much smaller market shares than is usually
associated with seller power. 12 The economic logic of buyer power causes
make the seller better off than selling the bundle to a buyer who values only part and that
must then resell the remainder. Such agreements can, however, also create antitrust
issues. See, e.g., United States v. Seminole Fertilizer Corp., No. 97-1507-CIV-T-17E,
1997 WL 692953 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 1997) (two potential bidders for assets to be sold
in a bankruptcy auction agreed not to bid against each other and split the assets after the
sale; the defendants ultimately entered into a consent decree).
10. See, e.g., Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 885 F.2d 313,
316-17 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that an agreement allocating the rights to movies among
theaters is not per se illegal); Alan Devlin, Questioning the Per Se Standard in Cases of
Concerted Monopsony, 3 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 223, 241-43 (2007) (arguing that the
reduced costs resulting from monopsony should be considered in assessing the
reasonableness of such collusion).
11. There is much debate among antitrust scholars as to whether antitrust should focus
only on consumer welfare, see, e.g., Jack Kirkwood & Robert Lande, The Fundamental
Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 191, 202-04, 206 (2008), or whether antitrust should focus on some broader total
welfare measure. See, e.g., Michael Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of
Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REv. 219, 220 (1995); William Kovacic, The Modem
Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 464
(2003). The analysis of buyer power demonstrates the limits of this narrow price-theory-
driven conceptualization of antitrust goals. Even though it is often the case that there is
no current consumer harm from exploiting buyer power, and indeed the only immediate
effect is to transfer surplus from seller to buyer without even changing the quantity sold,
as in the auction example discussed at supra note 1, there is still long term harm to
dynamic efficiency of the market. Hence, the better way to evaluate competition policy is
to focus on the impact of particular conduct on the competitive process. Unnecessary
interference with that process, which causes frustration of the market, is what antitrust
seeks to outlaw. This topic is discussed further at infra notes 81-89 and accompanying
text.
12. See infra notes 110-11.
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this result. 13 It has important policy implications for both the identification
of buyer cartels controlling only modest shares of relevant input markets
and for the assessment of the competitive risks that legitimate buyer
groups can present. 14
Third, the economic incentives of buyer cartels require modification of
the standard predictions that antitrust law uses to facilitate the inference of
agreement.' 5 Basically, buyer cartels can include more participants and
face lower risks of defections because of the inherent incentives of the
participants. 16 Moreover, the agreements themselves can be more
informal, even tacit, for the same reason. 17 Thus, the explication of buyer
cartel issues requires a fuller recognition of the incentives that motivate
and facilitate such conduct.18
Fourth, and finally, legitimate buying groups, although efficient
responses to the needs of their participants, can also pose real threats to the
long-term competitiveness of both the supply and demand sides of the
market. 19 The prevailing assumption of antitrust law-that even very large
buying groups are competitively benign-ignores the differences between
buyer and seller power that result in competitive risks from buyer power at
levels that arguably do not create serious concerns on the selling side.
20
Hence, antitrust enforcement policy needs to recognize and articulate,
more clearly than it does at present, the risks that powerful buyer groups
pose and, in light of those risks, adopt better standards for judging the
reasonableness of the conduct of any buying group.
2 1
The following analysis starts in Part I with an exposition of the
differences between buyer cartels and buying groups based on the
functional goals of these alternative buyer entities. Part I also focuses on
how to differentiate ambiguous situations between the two types of buying
entities. Part II addresses the analysis of buyer power itself, focusing on
the evidence supporting the need for different metrics to measure whether
a group of buyers have, or are likely to have, market power. Part II also
explains why buyer cartels and buying groups have market power based
on smaller market shares than are usually deemed relevant in assessing
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.B.
16. See infra Part III.B. 1.
17. See infra Part HI.B. 1.
18. See infra Part HI.B.
19. See infra Part III.B.2.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part V.
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seller side power.
Part III examines competitive policy issues raised by both buyer
cartels and buying groups. It reviews both the potential harm from buyer
cartels and also summarizes the arguments advanced by some scholars for
allowing such cartels in some contexts. In addition, Part III identifies and
elaborates on the potential harms to competition that legitimate buying
groups can create. Finally, Part III reviews how antitrust law has
responded to both kinds of buying entities.
Part IV evaluates critically the policy arguments that have so far
condemned all buyer cartels as per se illegal, while imposing a
reasonableness standard on buying groups. This Part argues that proven
cartels should continue to be per se illegal despite some theoretical
arguments for excusing buyer collusion in some contexts. It explains why
buyer cartels can be more inclusive and require less rigorous organization
and policing than seller cartels. With respect to buyer groups, Part IV
argues that the current rule of reason standards for judging the merits of
such entities can be too tolerant of conduct that, in fact, is likely to have
long run adverse effects on the competitive process. Hence, stricter
standards are needed to limit those risks either through imposing lower
thresholds for any safe harbor or by developing a stronger set of standards
to govern buyer conduct so that it does not adversely affect the
competitive process.
Four central conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, it can be
difficult to distinguish buyer cartels from legitimate buying groups in
many circumstances, but cartels should remain per se illegal. 2Second,
buyer cartels can involve larger and less well organized groups than
standard cartel theory postulates. 23 Third, buyer power in either a cartel or
buying group context can exist at lower levels of apparent concentration
than is customarily assumed.24 Fourth, legitimate buying groups create
significant competitive risks meriting stricter scrutiny of such organ-
izations than they have traditionally been accorded.25
I. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN BUYER CARTELS AND BUYING GROUPS
The distinction between a cartel and a buying group is easy at an
abstract, conceptual level.26 However, in application, the two types of
22. See infra Part I.C.
23. See infra Part H.
24. See infra Part II.
25. See infra Part III.B.2.
26. See Piraino, Buyers' Competitive Conduct, supra note 4, at 1131-32.
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activities exist in a continuum from a pure cartel to a buying group that
involves significant integration on the part of the participants and acts only
to facilitate buying in a competitive supply market. 27 The central problems
in characterization are that form and function are not congruent, and
buyers have no incentive to differentiate the basis on which they obtain
lower input prices. Hence, a group that is functionally a buying group can
appear to be little more than a cartel while it is equally possible to dress up
a cartel to look like a buying group. After briefly describing the
conceptual categories, this Part will examine some of the problems of
accurate characterization that can and have arisen in various contexts.
A. A Buyers' Cartel
The basic concept of a cartel is that it is a group of competitors who
have agreed to limit or eliminate their competition in some economically
relevant dimension.2 8 The only objective of such a combination is to
create, allocate, and exploit power in the market. Thus defined, this
concept is more inclusive than a price fixing cartel of standard legal
analysis. Some cartels work more effectively by allocating customers or
suppliers, agreeing on the composition of the output or input ratios, or
sharing information to ensure standardization of operations that indirectly
29
ensure uniformity of costs and then prices. Indeed, buyers sometimes use
their collective power to exclude or restrain their competitors in the
markets where they buy goods or otherwise regulate the non-price
dimensions of the supply market.
30
A buyers' cartel focuses on the input side of the market rather than the
output. The objective of such a group is to eliminate competition in some
aspect of their input purchases in order to reduce the prices associated with
27. See Joseph F. Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARv. L. REv.
1521, 1569-70 (1982).
28. See Natalie Rosenfelt, The Verdict on Monopsony, 20 LOY. CONSUMER L. REv.
402, 405-06 (2008).
29. See Robert Lande & Howard Marvel, The Three Types of Collusion: Fixing
Prices, Rivals, and Rules, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 941, 951-53 (describing various ways in
which naked restraints can achieve anticompetitive results).
30. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1959)
(holding that buyer induced or coerced suppliers to engage in a collective refusal to deal);
Montaque v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38, 45 (1904) (holding that buyer organization induced
sellers to refuse to deal with non-participants and to enforce resale price maintenance);
Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 936-38 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that major toy
buyer induced sellers of toys to agree to refuse to sell selected toys to competitors of the
buyer).
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such purchases or otherwise control supplier conduct.31 Lowering such
prices does not directly affect the prices that individual participants will
charge for their outputs. Downstream prices are a function of the market
or markets in which such sales are made.32 An important preliminary
point, therefore, is that buyers might collude to drive down prices even
though they sell in highly competitive markets where cartelization is
unlikely.33 In addition, buyer collusion is likely to eventually reduce the
total output in the market due to such conduct. The likelihood of this effect
and its substantiality are functions of the elasticity of supply, as will be
discussed subsequently. But if buyers cause a sufficient reduction in
output, this can affect the downstream market by increasing scarcity of the
product made with that input, resulting in higher prices for the remaining
production.
34
Examples abound of buyer combinations. One of the earliest private
antitrust cases challenged a buying cartel of mantel and fireplace tile
retailers. 35 This group insisted that the manufacturers only deal with its
members, thereby boycotting all that group's competitors. The manu-
facturers were also required to adopt and enforce resale price maintenance.
This is a more effective way for retailers to police a resale cartel than to
use direct action. 36 Thus, the buyer cartel sought to control input prices
and the retail market for the products. Another early case involved the
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Association that used its buying
31. See Vogel v. Am. Soc. of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 601 (7th Cir. 1984).
32. See, e.g., Devlin, supra note 10, at 233.
33. A good example is the timber buyers cartel in Alaska that drove down the price of
trees in specific regions where those companies operated, but which had no effect on the
overall price of the lumber produced from those trees, as that lumber competed in a much
more inclusive geographic market. Reid Bros. Logging Co. v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 699
F.2d 1292, 1303 (9th Cir. 1983); cf Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood
Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007) (finding that buyer of timber was able to drive
competitors from the market by bidding up the price of logs while reselling resulting
lumber in a market where it presumably had no market power, but proof did not satisfy
narrow requirements for antitrust monopolization claim).
34.This effect is discussed in ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFERY L. HARRISON,
MONOPsONY: ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICs 36-42 (1993). See also Richard Sexton
& Mingxia Zhang, An Assessment of the Impact of Food Industry Market Power on U.S.
Consumers, 17 AGRIBUSINESS 59 (2001); Chris Doyle & Martijn A. Han, Expropriating
Monopoly Rents through Stable Buyer Groups (Amsterdam Ctr. for L. & Econ., Working
Paper No. 2009-03).
35. Montaque v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904).
36. See JOSEPH C. PALAMOUNTAIN, JR., THE POLITICS OF DISTRIBUTION 99-100
(Greenwood Press 1968) (1955); Ward Bowman, The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale
Price Maintenance, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 825, 834-35 (1955); Doyle & Han, supra note 34;
Lester Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3. J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960).
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power to compel lumber companies to refuse to deal with wholesalers that
chose to combine wholesaling and retailing.37 Thus, like the mantel case,
this cartel used its buyer power to eliminate potentially more efficient
competition.
Other buyer cartels have focused on labor or agricultural inputs.
Several cases have challenged the practices of hospitals and other
employers of nurses that alleged they engaged in collective wage setting
outside of a union contract.3 8 A recent case also upheld a complaint
challenging as a buyer cartel a scheme to coordinate job classifications
and consequent wage rates for various types of professional workers in the
energy industries.39 Similar cartels have been documented in agriculture
with respect to blueberries in Maine4 ° and tobacco in the southeast.41
Another classic case involved an agreement to set the percentage of
Durham wheat in macaroni and spaghetti when that type of wheat was in
short supply.42 Finally, there are a number of auction cartels such as that
involving postage stamps.
43
As these examples suggest, buyer cartels can use their power directly
to lower prices paid by the participants, and/or they can use the power to
regulate aspects of competition in the downstream markets. The uses of
cartel power will vary depending on the goals and interests of the
participants, but also, importantly, on the nature of the supply market. If
supply is relatively price inelastic, then colluding buyers have a strong
incentive to drive down price because it will not significantly reduce the
37. E. States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
38. See, e.g, Fleischman v. Albany Med. Ctr., No. 1:06-CV-765, 2009 WL 1362801
(N.D.N.Y. May 14, 2009). Where a union represents employees, industry wide
bargaining is lawful if in conformity with the National Labor Relations Act, and exempt
from antitrust liability. This is an example of countervailing power which some scholars
use to justify more pervasive use of buyer cartels as well. See JOHN K. GALBRAITH,
AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER 109-12 (1952).
39. Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 191 (2d Cir. 2001).
40. See John R. Wilke, Bully Buyers: How Driving Prices Lower Can Violate
Antitrust Statutes; 'Monopsony' Suits Mount As Companies Are Accused Of Squeezing
Suppliers; Farmers vs. Cigarette Makers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2004, at Al, available at
http://www.finpc.uconn.edu/research/milk/WSJ012704.pdf.
41. Id.; see also DeLoach v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 391 F.3d 551, 554 (4th Cir.
2004).
42. Nat'l Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421, 426-27 (7th Cir. 1965)
(holding that an agreement of macaroni producers to reduce the amount of durum wheat
purchased as an input for pasta production was per se unlawful).
43. See Asker, supra note 1; Robert C. Marshall & Michael J. Meurer, Bidder
Collusion and Antitrust Law: Refining the Analysis of Price Fixing to Account for the
Special Features ofAuction Markets, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 83 (2004).
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supply of the input.4 In other cases, supply may be more price elastic and
so reducing price would result in an inadequate supply; but the buyers can
still use their collective power to compel their suppliers to discriminate in
price or refuse to deal with new entrants or marginal buyers.45 The risk to
the seller is that the marginal gain from such sales will not offset the risk
of loss associated with the refusal of major established customers to
continue to buy from the seller. Thus, supply elasticity will affect the goals
of a cartel but will not necessarily deter it from coming into being.46
Another type of buyer cartel occurs when an agent coordinates the
buying of goods or services for an economically significant group of
buyers. The consolidation of demand means that the agent wields sub-
stantial economic power in bargaining on behalf of its principals. If the
agent's role is only to exploit that collective power by forcing down input
prices, it is acting as cartel coordinator. The agent may also use its power
to demand that the sellers provide the agent with extra benefits. This can
occur when the principals are not fully aware of the fact that the agent has
created buyer power by its pooling of demand. This kind of cartel
occurred recently in the high-end business liability insurance market
where the agents induced the insurers to create a seller cartel, then the
agents allocated the business among the insurers and collected extra
compensation based on the cartel overcharges imposed on their prin-
cipals.4 7
The hallmark of the cartel is that the buyers have only coordinated
their buying in order to exercise power over sellers. The clearest cases
involve situations where each buyer undertakes all the actual buying
activity that is necessary to obtain supplies. Thus, the buyers have in no
44. Alternatively, if the buyers can obtain additional inputs from some other market
such that they can exploit one set of suppliers while filling their residual supply needs
from another more competitive market, then they will be somewhat less concerned about
the supplier reaction, although even then, if there is a very substantial reduction in
supply, driving down prices will not make sense.
45. The ability to buy in volume gives a cartel significant leverage over any individual
seller because that seller must engage in a costly and time consuming search for other
buyers. See Peter C. Carstensen, Buyer Power, Competition Policy, and Antitrust: The
Competitive Effects of Discrimination Among Suppliers, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 271, 281,
284 (2008).
46. BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 34. Doyle & Han, supra note 34, posit a buyer
cartel that requires suppliers to raise their prices, thus causing some reduction in sales,
but capturing significant monopsony profits which are then rebated to the buyers in the
form of slotting fees or other kickbacks.
47. See Mario Lozano, Marsh Executive Pleads Guilty in Ongoing Insurance Probe,
LEGALNEWSWATCH, Jan. 12, 2005, http://www.legalnewswatch.com/526/marsh-execu
tive-pleads-guilty-in-ongoing-insurance-probe.
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way integrated any part of their buying activity.
B. Legitimate Buying Groups
The fundamental distinction between a legitimate buyer group and a
cartel is that the group acts to gain the efficiencies of a joint enterprise.48
These efficiencies include the efficiencies achieved by the supplier
(passed on at a lower price) resulting from longer production runs,
reduction in transaction costs, lower costs per unit of quality control
including protecting against defective or dangerous products, better
priorities from shipping services based on the volume involved, and
improved ability to develop new products.49 The buyer participants have
engaged in a partial integration of their input function by creating or
participating in the buying group.
Overt buyer groups are ones that are self-consciously organized. They
occur in a number of retail activities. Two prominent examples are Topco,
which provided a joint buying program for its mid-sized grocery store
members as well as creating house brands for them, 50 and Northwest
Wholesale Stationers which provided buying, warehousing, and delivery
services to retail stationery stores in the Pacific Northwest.5 Other
examples include cooperative buying groups in auto parts and hardware.52
A second type of buying group is one that is the creation of an
entrepreneurial actor that sponsors the group and acts as its agent.
48. See Joel Davidow, Antitrust, Foreign Policy, and International Buying Cooperat-
ion, 84 YALE L.J. 268, 271-74 (1974).
49. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to the Conduct of
Retailers, Dealers, and Other Resellers, 73 WASH. L. REV. 799, 835-36 (1998)
(discussing buying group efficiencies in the reselling markets).
50. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 598 (1972); see also Peter
C. Carstensen & Harry First, Rambling Through Economic Theory: Topco 's Closer Look,
in ANTITRUST STORIES 171 (Eleanor Fox & Dan Crane eds., 2007).
51. See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 286-87 (1985); see also Ed Brunet & David J. Sweeney, Integrating Antitrust
Procedure and Substance After Northwest Wholesale Stationers: Evolving Approaches to
Pleadings, Burden of Proof and Boycotts, 72 VA. L. REv. 1015 (1986).
52. Hardlines Buying Groups-Handy Hardware Wholesale, United Hardware
Distributing, HOME CHANNEL NEWS, July 3, 2000, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m
OVCW/is 13 26/ai_63993592 (last visited Jan. 22, 2010) (discussing changes at a
hardware buying group); see AutoValue.com, Alliance History, http://www.800autotalk.
com/showpage.php?pageid=history.htm&menu=about.menu (last visited Jan. 22, 2010)
(discussing development of Aftermarket Auto Parts Alliance, Inc., a buying group
representing over fifty auto parts distributors located in the United States and foreign
countries).
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Sometimes these arrangements take the form of a franchise type of
relationship, such as the IGA or Piggly Wiggly grocery chains.53 Here the
upstream coordinator offers prospective (or actual) participants in the
downstream market the ability to have an important part of the provision
of inputs administered by a third party with more efficient skills. This is a
form of partial vertical integration. As in the direct buyer groups, the
economic logic is that some functions (here supplying important cate-
gories of inputs including potentially branding and advertising) have
significant economies of scale and scope, and so produce the gains from
participation. But other aspects of the business create diseconomies of
scale, and so by separating them, the resulting partially integrated
enterprises are more efficient at both levels than would be a fully
integrated enterprise. The evidence from the grocery business is that in the
1950s and 1960s, at least, national chains were less efficient than regional
chains overall.54 In part, the explanation is that the regional chains used
buying groups to get the efficiency of the national chains but avoided the
inefficiencies of a central management trying to coordinate retailing
operations in a number of diverse and dispersed local markets.
As will be discussed in more detail below, there are no fixed
parameters for a buying group. A legitimate group does involve some
integration of activities, but the specific activities to integrate will be a
function of the economic logic of the particular enterprise.5 5 One way to
distinguish the buying group is to focus on its functional goals. If it exists
to consolidate, coordinate, and administer the buying activities of its
participants such that they are making some investment in and sharing
some productive activities with the venture, then it is prima facie a buying
group. When the group exists only to agree on how the parties will
conduct their own purchases, it is prima facie a cartel.
56
C. Distinguishing Buying Groups from Cartels
Because of the flexibility inherent in the organization of a legitimate
53. PigglyWiggly.com, About Us, http://www.pigglywiggly.com (last visited Jan. 22,
2010). IGA claims to be the largest grocery provider with over four thousand
participating stores in forty-one countries. See IGA, About Us, http://www.iga.net.au/iga
fresh/index.cfm?pageid=2298&TempLeve I lPagelD=2298 (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
54. Carstensen & First, supra note 50, at 178-79.
55. See Paul W. Dobson, Exploiting Buyer Power: Lessons from the British Grocery
Trade, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 529, 543-44 (2005) (discussing integrated buying groups in the
British grocery industry).
56. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219,
223-24 (1948) (holding that buying agreement among sugar refiners constituted a cartel).
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buying group, there can be significant difficulty in distinguishing such
entities from cartels. Moreover, once a group has the appearance of a
buying group, it can also impose other restraints on its suppliers such as
requiring them to refuse to deal with non-members or requiring more
favorable terms than other buyers. 57 In addition, the group may engage in
coordinating downstream competition through various restraints including
resale price controls or territorial allocation. 58 There are plausible
theoretical arguments in support of many of those restraints as necessary
to facilitate the legitimate interests of the group. Thus, many groups of
competitors that desire to coordinate their buying activities can with only
modest planning create an entity that has the appearance of being a buying
group rather than a naked cartel.
Nevertheless, it is possible to characterize some agreements among
buyers as nothing but cartels. The central preliminary factual question is
whether the group has integrated any of its buying activity. In situations
where there is no integration, but only an agreement about how each
independent participant will behave as a buyer, then the resulting entity is
a pure cartel. This is true whether the group has agreed to coordinate job
and wage classifications, 59 engaged in refusals to deal to enforce
60regulations on downstream competition, set input proportions to reduce
the price of a scarce input, or allocated bidding or other options among
the participants. 62 Indeed, when a group is primarily focused on using its
buyer power to regulate competition in the downstream market, the cartel
characterization is easier than when the group focuses more directly on
input prices.
In contrast, a basic buying group is readily distinguishable when its
purchases involve a modest share of the total market. This is particularly
true when the sellers are likely to experience economies resulting from
larger orders and would generally welcome volume buyers. In addition,
where the elasticity of supply is substantial, such as when the sellers will
substantially reduce production of the input if price is depressed below a
reasonably profitable level, the plausibility of a buying group being a
57. See Davidow, supra note 48, at 270.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 601-04 (1972)
(describing the territorial assignment system).
59. Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 195-97 (2d Cir. 2001).
60. See, e.g., E. States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600
(1914); see also Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 209 (1959).
61. Nat'l Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421, 422-23 (7th Cir. 1965).
62. United States v. Taubman, 297 F.3d 161, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2002) (affirming guilty
verdict in art auction conspiracy).
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legitimate method of seeking economies and efficiencies in the trans-
actional aspects of buying becomes more likely. This would also likely
create higher net profits (and increased output) to producers while at the
same time holding the total cost (price plus transactional expenses) down
for buyers. Again, the specific focus on the activities and functions of the
buying group will be important because even in elastic supply markets, a
buyers' cartel controlling a sufficient share63 of the buying side might well
impose its will on producers with respect to non-price aspects of
competition.
However, apparently legitimate buying groups can easily implement
cartelistic restraints. Indeed, such an organization can provide a cover for
an ongoing buyers' cartel either as the primary or a significant secondary
objective for the group. Indeed, given their underlying goal of reducing
the cost of inputs, the buying group with any appreciable buying power
will have an incentive to use that power to reduce prices further by pure
exercise of its power. Of course, if the suppliers respond by reducing
output, then the buying group must ration supply among its members or
find a way to induce increased output despite lower prices. One solution
64that can apply is to use an "all or nothing" contract. The buyer offers to
take only the quantity it desires and otherwise refuses to buy at all. So
long as the offered price approximates the seller's average total cost, it is
likely to take the offer even though the marginal cost of the incremental
units exceeds the price received.65 The effect of such contracts in the short
run is to transfer producer surplus to the buyer, but in the long run it
results in disincentives for the producer to remain in the market given the
reduced reward. Thus, the use of such contracts can harm the competitive
process over time.66 Of course, if the producer achieves economies of
scale or scope through a large volume contract, an "all or nothing" offer
provides a contractual means for the buying group to capture some or all
of the efficiency gain that results from their joint purchase.6 7 Hence, the
elasticity of supply and the consequences for efficiency of increased
output are important characteristics in differentiating the competitive
63. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
64. BLAIR & HARRIsON, supra note 34.
65. The use of such a contract implies that diseconomies of scale exist for the
producer. Thus, under standard price theory, the producer would reduce output to a level
consistent with the marginal cost of the unit produced. The "all or nothing" contract
denies the producer the opportunity to refine its production to fit the price offered and
discipline the buyer who wants a greater quantity but who will not pay for it.
66. The analysis of such contracts is found in Carstensen, supra note 45, at 282-83,
298-99, and BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 34, at 73-75.
67. Carstensen, supra note 45, at 301-02.
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implications of apparently similar actions.
This potential to mask a cartel or cartelistic components within an
apparently legitimate venture is a significant factor in understanding why
antitrust enforcers developed "safe harbor" standards that create a
presumption of legitimacy for entities that buy no more than some fraction
of the total supplies being purchased in the market. 68 Such a system
assumes that buyers that collectively take no more than the safe harbor
percentage will lack the power to impose conditions that unduly restrict
access to input markets for either buyers or sellers. So long as the safe
harbor does no more than create a presumption of legality for the venture,
it is probably a useful enforcement screen. But as shown subsequently in
this Article, the screen needs to be set in terms of the actual risk of abuse
of buyer power whether the group has legitimate functions or not.
Moreover, this screen should be understood as creating no more than a
presumption of lawfulness for the group.69
II. APPROPRIATE METRICS FOR MEASURING BUYER POWER
A central fact about buying and selling is that the buyer is the party
that decides when, how much, and from whom to buy. Thus, buyers have
power in the market whenever that discretionary power has significance
for sellers. 70 It follows that a buying group can achieve significant buyer
68. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Beyond Per Se, Rule of Reason or Merger Analysis: A
New Antitrust Standard for Joint Ventures, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1, 41 n.184 (1991) (noting
that "[a] few federal courts have held that" buying groups lacking market power were not
deemed illegal and that the European Economic Community and Japan have safe harbor
provisions for "firms that lack significant market power").
69. As articulated in the health care guidelines, up to a 35 percent share of purchases
in any product line will leave a buyer group presumptively lawful. Moreover, the
definition of a buying group is not well developed, nor are criteria laid down that such a
presumptively legal entity must satisfy. This latter omission is troublesome because it
leaves the door open to creating apparently lawful entities that only operate to limit buyer
competition for inputs. Further, if several buying groups buy from the same vendor, they
can create serious market foreclosure problems that adversely affect the competitive
process. See Julie C. Klish, Serving Economic Efficiencies or Anticompetitive Purposes?
The Future of Group Purchasing Organizations and the Antitrust Safety Zone, 2 IND.
HEALTH L. REv. 173 (2005).
70. One interesting illustration of this power in a non-economic context is Texas'
power over high school and grade school textbooks. By regulating the content of such
texts and establishing a list of approved books, Texas can and does control the content of
textbooks, despite its relatively modest share of total public school enrollment. Texas'
buyer power is substantial even though no conventional antitrust specialist would regard
the state as constituting a sufficiently large part of the total textbook market for textbooks
to possess buyer power. See Stephanie Simon, The Culture Wars' New Front: U.S.
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power when it has a modest share of the total input market. Data from the
United Kingdom suggests that buyers taking as little as 10 percent of the
total sales of grocery products had significant buyer power. The Toys R
Us case and the older Klor's case also demonstrate that important buyers
can exercise significant power even if they do not buy very large shares of
the inputs involved.72
More formal economic modeling shows that both demand and supply
elasticity are important factors in specifying the degree of buyer power
that a firm or group of firms will have. 73 This suggests that some capacity
to affect prices will arise from many buying groups and cartels even when
they do not take a share of the total input market that would trigger
concern if looked at on the seller side. Supply inelasticity is a particularly
relevant part of the buyer power analysis. The more a producer is
committed for the intermediate or longer term to a set quantity of output,
the greater is the capacity of even relatively small volume buyers to
exercise buyer power.74 In addition, optimal output is a function of plant
size, but when there are significant diseconomies involved in reducing
production below the optimal level, such a producer is very vulnerable to
buyer power. In such a situation, the seller has particular incentive to
History Classes in Texas, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2009, at A14, available at http://online.w
sj.com/article/SB 124753078523935615.html.
71. Dobson, supra note 55, at 537.
72. Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 937 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that market
share of about 20 percent of all toys sold in the United States conferred sufficient power
to impose anticompetitive restraints on suppliers); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,
Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 & n.7 (1959) (finding that even where no market shares were
given, the defendant, a large department store chain, one of many retailers of appliances
in California, still had sufficient buyer power to induce suppliers to collude to exclude a
competitor of the large buyer).
73. BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 34, at 47-61 (providing formulas and illustrating
the interaction between supply and demand elasticity).
74. For example, buyer power particularly affects farmers. See AMERICAN ANTITRUST
INSTITUTE, THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA: THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE'S
TRANSITION REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY TO THE 44TH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES 290-305 (2008), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/Archives/transition
report.ashx. Crops reflect a basically committed output set at the time of planting,
regardless of the price of the crops at the time of harvest. Chickens mature in only a few
months, but a farmer makes long-term capital investments (sunk costs) in hen houses
financed by bank loans, thus imposing the economic necessity of operating at or near full
capacity. Id. at 304. In the case of beef cattle, the production cycle is approximately three
years from gestation until slaughter. Id. at 291. Upon gestation, little opportunity exists to
speed up or slow down the process. Dairy cows produce milk for years, so the output of
the dairy industry is also largely a given over any period of time. Id. at 299-304. Farmers,
therefore, are particularly vulnerable to buyer power.
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retain the necessary volume to achieve efficient production.
Some buyer power is not necessarily undesirable from the perspective
of maintaining a workable competitive process. 75 When buyers confront
sellers with modestly large market shares, there is likely to be sufficient
countervailing power such that the resulting prices are consistent with a
reasonable measure of the costs of production. In most input markets, the
transactions take place in one-on-one sales where both buyer and seller
have some flexibility as to price.77 In such situations, there is no inherent
market price. Thus, some power that assists the buyer in negotiation is not
itself unreasonable or undesirable. For this reason, it makes little sense
from a broader public policy perspective to challenge every legitimate
small buying group that has some power with respect to every condition it
might impose on its suppliers. However, it is also important, based on the
foregoing empirical and anecdotal evidence, that any presumptive safe
harbor be narrowly defined, both as to the scope of the harbor and the
strength of the presumption, in order to avoid the potentially significant
competitive risks that in fact arise from buying groups, whatever their
intended function, once they obtain 15 to 20 percent of the market.
The product and geographic boundaries of input markets can be, and
often are, quite different from the boundaries of the downstream markets
into which the products made from these inputs are sold. In the case of
agricultural products, the initial geographic dimensions of the market are
often very confined because many products and animals cannot be
transported very far before processing. In contrast, the market for
manufactured components can be global even if the final product, whether
a computer or processed food, is sold in a very localized retail market.
Closely related is the need to have an appropriate product market
definition. Product inputs can have a variety of uses (e.g., milk yields
cheese, butter, and ice cream) that are not very competitive in the
downstream market, yet the input can be used in any of the outputs.
Hence, the relevant product market should not be equated with any
specific output use. On the other hand, some inputs such as specific
grocery products or any other retail item do not define the scope of the
75. See Devlin, supra note 10, at 232-33.
76. Id. at 233.
77. Some inputs are sold in truly transactional, public markets with posted prices such
as those seen in securities and commodities futures markets. But, more frequently, the
posted price in exchange transactions provides the basis for a negotiated, off-exchange
deal. For example, most beef cattle today are sold subject to various kinds of forward
looking contractual arrangements in which the price term is based on a market price but
then subject to various adjustments. Id. at 297.
2010]
20 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
output market but are distinct products from an intermediate buyer-
processor's perspective. A retailer cannot substitute pork for beef at the
meat counter or men's running shoes for women's dress shoes. Thus, the
specific input, even if it is only a component becomes a separate product
market from the perspective of the buyer and seller.
The central observation is that competition policy focused on the input
side of the market needs to have appropriate metrics for defining the
markets in both product and geographic terms. It also must employ
measures of market power that are appropriate to the buying side of the
market. The data strongly supports the conclusion that modest shares
(from the selling perspective) create significant potential buyer power.
Hence, any presumptions of lawfulness must be appropriately confined to
situations where the buyer or buying group has less than 15 percent of the
relevant input market.
III. THE MERITS AND DEMERITS OF BUYER CARTELS AND BUYING GROUPS
A. Buyer Cartels-Competitive Harms, Market Justifications
1. The Negative Views
The conventional analysis of buyer cartels is that they cause economic
harm similar to that resulting from seller cartels. But just like seller cartels,
some scholars defend buyer cartels as enhancing efficiency in some
circumstances. Some buyer organizations, such as independent pharm-
acies, have sought antitrust immunity for proposed cartels. 79 So far,
Congress has not granted such rights.
The economic argument against buyer cartels rests on an assumption
about the nature of producer response that creates a demonstrable welfare
harm. The standard argument assumes that buyers purchase in discrete
units and that the buyers resell in a market in which they are the only
sellers. Under these assumptions, when the price paid for inputs is
reduced, output of that commodity declines. As a result, the static
comparison of a world with and without a buyer cartel shows that the
78. See Devlin, supra note 10.
79. In October of 2007, the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing to consider
legislation that would legalize a cartel among independent pharmacies. See Impact of Our
Antitrust Laws on Community Pharmacies and Their Patients: Hearing Before the Task
Force on Antitrust and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. (2007), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrgl1038336/
pdf/CHRD- 110hhrgl 1038336.pdf [hereinafter Impact ofAntitrust Laws].
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cartel causes a reduction in production and a consequent increase in price
to consumers. On that basis, it is possible to reach the conclusion that
buyer cartels harm consumers by causing lower output and higher prices.
The force of this comparative statics argument is contingent on the
validity of its factual assumptions. As a result, it loses force if either the
buyers can compel the producers to deliver approximately the same output
at the lower price or the buyers compete in a resale market with many
other producers such that the resale price is set competitively and the
cartel has no incentive or capacity to raise the prices of its output.
80
When buyers can make an "all or nothing" offer to a producer that has
increasing marginal cost, the buyer can offer to buy a large volume at a
price equal to the average cost of production. It will be rational for the
producer to accept this offer and deliver the same quantity that it would
have delivered at a market price equal to the marginal cost of its last
unit.8 1 This means the buyer can induce a level of production comparable
to the competitive level, but at the same time transfer all the infra-
marginal gain (Riccardian Rents) to themselves. 82 From the perspective of
comparative statics, there is no efficiency harm because there is the same
production and price is not increased. There is a transfer of surplus from
seller to buyer, but the contemporary economic welfare model is not
concerned about that.
83
80. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S.
312 (2007).
81. In conventional price theory, the marginal cost of the final unit sold sets the price
for all units in an optimally efficient, competitive market. If the cost of producing other
units is lower, then the producer realizes a profit on those units. This provides an
important incentive to innovate and improve the efficiency of production since the
efficient producer with lower costs retains the gain from its efficient production given the
market price set by the cost of the marginal unit.
82. For a discussion of the different types of gains that buyers might transfer, see
Roger G. Noll, "Buyer Power" and Economic Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 589, 592-94
(2005). If producers have economies of scale at the prevailing market price, each will
have an interest in producing more at a lower price so long as the price reduction does not
exceed the efficiency gain to the producer. For more discussion, see Carstensen, supra
note 45.
83. Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 11, argue that transfers of consumer surplus
resulting from anticompetitive conduct by sellers is a proper basis for antitrust concern.
Ironically, they are reluctant to accept a similar argument when it comes to transfers of
producer surplus. Their premise is that buyer power will often result in lower prices to the
final consumer. The empirical basis for this assumption is not evident. It is likely that
some retail market contexts do in fact make it more likely that the lower costs of inputs
will result in lower final prices. But even then, there is a real question of whether the long
run interest in an efficient, dynamic, and equitable market process is well served when
buyers use their power to extract all the producer surplus of their suppliers. This question
2010]
22 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
A second weakness in the standard story is its assumption that the
buying market and the markets in which the buyers resell are congruent
with each other, i.e., that the buyers compete in the same buying and
selling markets without any other competitors. This is often very far from
an accurate description. Buying markets can be quite narrow in both
geographic and product terms, but the market for the product being sold
can be much larger and subject to more competition from other sources
and substitutes.84 Where such conditions exist, the buyers' cartel can
depress the price of inputs in a distinct input market, but may face
effective competition in the output market. Faced with such a situation, the
cartel will depress input prices but sell at the market price. Assuming that
there is no "all or nothing" buying, the cartel's output will be lower than it
would have been, but this will not noticeably affect the output market if it
is workably competitive. Here again there is a wealth transfer from sellers
to buyers, and a dynamic harm to aggregate efficiency as the afflicted
producers reduce output that would have been economically rational had
there been perfect competition in the market for the input. But consumers
are unaffected in the static short run.
By focusing on economic measures of welfare, whether total,
producer, or consumer welfare, the argument that buyer cartels are
necessarily undesirable is not strong. Hence, much of the rhetorical basis
for condemning buyer cartels is based on an appeal to symmetry with the
condemnation of seller cartels. This is the oft reiterated claim that
monopsony and monopoly are "mirror images." 85 This claim has a logic in
that both kinds of exploitation can result in harms to aggregate welfare.
However, it is highly misleading in that it ignores the ways in which those
harms occur which, as shown above, vary significantly with whether one
is looking at buyer power or seller power. Moreover, the amount of power
necessary to create adverse competitive effects is significantly different in
the two domains. 86 This leads to a serious risk of false positives with
respect to buyer power. 87 For present purposes, the central point is that
conventional static economic analysis does not provide a robust basis for
condemning categorically buyer cartels.
A great debate exists among scholars of antitrust law and economics
is the focus of the discussion at infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
84. Many agricultural products fit this model, as well as other low value, bulky inputs,
or ones that spoil easily.
85. See, e.g., Noll, supra note 82, at 589-92 (arguing for a symmetrical monopsony
and monopoly policy).
86. Id. at 589.
87. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying test.
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concerning the question of whether antitrust should concern itself with
consumer harms narrowly defined or with the aggregate harm to economic
welfare.88 Both concepts are static and highly abstracted. They do
underscore a basic observation that restraints which raise prices to
consumers, reduce choices, exclude competition, etc., are generally
undesirable. The proponents of an aggregate view would like to balance
all gains and losses to all stakeholders. These proponents particularly like
this approach when applied to complex cases, usually involving
monopolistic practices or restraints subject to a rule of reason analysis.
They assume that such aggregate impact information can be produced and
so in its absence would presume that conduct that potentially could have
positive as well as negative effects is likely to be positive and so lawful.
89
Opponents of the aggregate view focus on whether consumers have
increased burdens, either in terms of prices or choices, as the basis to
condemn specific acts or practices. 90 This position draws on parts of the
legislative history of the Sherman Act.91 This position also rests on a more
skeptical view about the underlying merits of such conduct. In general,
these scholars believe that the competitive process is adversely affected by
more of these business practices despite having potential justification.
Another strand of this view is that there are often less anticompetitive
ways to achieve any legitimate business objective. Hence, the specific
conduct imposing costs on consumers is not essential to the efficient
operation of the market.
When applied to buyer power cases, the debate is largely circular and
unhelpful. The consumer effect focus denies that many buyer cartels harm
the economy because their only static effect is to transfer producer surplus
from one class of producer (the up-stream entity) to another producer (the
down-stream entity).92 The aggregate effect position, while more support-
88. The latest installment in this debate is Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 11.
89. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 11.
90. See, e.g., Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 11.
91.Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGs L.J. 65 (1982).
92. See Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 11. Kirkwood and Lande assert, "[t]he
primary goal of antitrust is to protect consumers from paying higher prices," and so they
contend that only a "few" circumstances justify protecting sellers from buyer power. Id.
at 196, 208. Moreover, they focus exclusively on "small businesses." Id. at 209.
Ultimately, however, they agree that buyer cartels are illegal regardless of their effect on
consumers although they do not address the competitive implications of buyer groups. Id
Hence, they do not examine fully the impact of buyer power on the longer-term
competitiveness of the market place even though they recognize the importance of a
focus on market dynamics. Id. at 209-10. See also Devlin, supra note 10.
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ive of the validity of condemning buyer cartels and other restraints on
input suppliers, insists on a total accounting for costs and benefits to the
overall economy in the short run. Such a calculus is both very difficult and
may, because so much of the initial harm is only wealth transfer, lead to
significant tolerance of cartels on the buying side where there is no
showing of reduced output. In effect, this argument is what prevailed in
the Weyerhaeuser case in the Supreme Court.
9 3
Two other policy arguments, however, support a broader
condemnation of buyer cartels. First, a primary concern of antitrust law-
some would argue its central concern-is the protection and advancement
of economic competition as a process.94 In one way, the dispute
concerning the choice of aggregate welfare or consumer welfare reflects
contending positions on the scope of concern about competition as a
process. The aggregate welfare position is one that is more tolerant of acts
and practices that demonstrably interfere with competition because of the
assumption of the relative, overall perfection of the market process.
Hence, disruptions are expected to be temporary and self-corrected. The
consumer welfare position is more consistent with skepticism about the
self-correcting nature of the market and so looks for immediate effects as
proof of market failure and the need for legal remedy. That latter position
is more consistent with the historical roots of antitrust law and the initial
interpretations of the Sherman Act.95 Indeed, as Kirkwood has shown in
93. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312
(2007). Subsequently, however, a jury found that Weyerhaeuser had overcharged
customers of Alder Lumber. Amy Hsuan, Forest Firm Fined for Alder Log Monopoly,
OREGONiAN, Apr. 30, 2008, at B1. For a discussion of the merits of the Supreme Court
decision see Roger D. Blair & John E. Lopatka, Predatory Buying and the Antitrust
Laws, 2008 UTAH L. REv. 415.
94. William Jones made an elegant argument for this position. William K. Jones,
Concerted Refusals to Deal and the Producer Interest in Antitrust, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 73
(1989).
95. For example, the first restraint of trade case recognized that antitrust law was
designed to protect when changes are effected by combinations of capital whose purpose
in combining is to control the production or manufacture of any particular article in the
market and by such control dictate the price at which the article shall be sold. The effect
would be to drive out of business all the small dealers in the commodity and to render the
public subject to the decision of the combination as to what price shall be paid for the
article. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323-24 (1896). A
similar view of the centrality of the competitive process is found in the famous Sixth
Circuit decision by William Howard Taft in the Addyston Pipe case. Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States, 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd as modified, 175 U.S. 211
(1899); see generally Peter C. Carstensen, Lost in (Doctrinal) Translation: The
Misleading Retelling of the Supreme Court's Antitrust Decisions on Restraints of Trade,
62 SMU L. REv. 525, 526-27 (2009).
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other writings, the courts have generally ignored the welfare debate and
focused on the assessment of harm to the competitive process as the
touchstone of evaluation. 96 The competitive process criterion is partic-
ularly helpful in arguing for a strong policy of prohibition of buyer cartels.
Such cartels, like seller cartels, substitute private agreements for the
market process. They create the kind of risks to that process that the
Supreme Court has repeatedly identified.97
Second, from the perspective of dynamic economics, a buyer cartel
distorts incentives and causes a misallocation of economic rewards over
time. As such, it weakens the core goals of a competitive markets system.
This policy focuses on the dynamic interest in having proper incentives to
invest in activities and develop new, innovative solutions to problems.
Buyer cartels, however they operate, diminish the rewards to the producer
below the level that a competitive market would have provided. 98 As such,
they send the wrong signal to investors and innovators. Indeed, the
strategic responses to cartels, such as vertical integration, while rational in
context of responding to a buyer cartel, in dynamic terms can result in
further distortions of the market process away from the best structural
options.
99
2. The Justification for Buyer Cartels
The primary argument for buyer cartels rests on notions of
countervailing power.'00 Essentially, if a group of small, powerless buyers
face a monopoly or oligopoly supplier, then individually they are power-
less to bargain for better prices and larger outputs.' The small buyers are
compelled to pay the monopoly or oligopoly price demanded by the
sellers. However, if these individual buyers can group together and make a
96. John B. Kirkwood, Consumers, Economics, and Antitrust, in 21 RES. L. & ECON.,
ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 21 (John B. Kirkwood ed., 2004).
97. See, e.g., FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990); Fashion
Originators Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
98. See generally BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 34.
99. Cf Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gibarco, Inc., 127 F.3d. 1157 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding
a vertical exclusive dealing foreclosing alternative distribution plan under antitrust law
even though serious questions existed as to whether this integration served efficiency
interests of consumers).
100. GALBRAITH, supra note 38, at 109-12 (1952).
101. See generally Thomas Campbell, Bilateral Monopoly in Mergers, 74 ANTITRUST
L.J. 521 (2007). This article produced some strong disagreement. Jonathan B. Baker,
Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Merger to Monopoly to Serve a Single Buyer: Comment,
75 ANTITRUST L.J. 637, 637-46 (2008).
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creditable threat that they would withhold their purchases unless lower
prices and greater quantity were offered, they might succeed in bargaining
down prices and increasing output.1
0 2
Recently, independent pharmacies sought an antitrust exemption in
order to collaborate together to bargain over prices with wholesalers.
0 3
Their argument was that the sellers are oligopolists who engage in both
price discrimination and impose excessive prices on independent
retailers. 10 4 The belief is that if they were allowed to band together,
independent pharmacies would obtain lower prices for the prescription
drugs they resell.10 5 Lower prices in turn would allow them to increase
sales volume as well as obtain a higher margin on sales. Since many drugs
are unique, the merits of this claim may be questionable, but the concept is
clear enough. 1
06
The underlying model is again a static comparative welfare one. The
assumption is that the successful buyer cartel will induce the seller to
reduce prices and increase output such that the market moves toward the
price and output that would exist if the industry was competitive. 107 This is
a bargaining model in which the assumption is that the buyers' cartel
would have sufficient power to compel the seller to reduce prices and
increase output. 108 Such an outcome is contingent on the relative options
of each side as well as its bargaining skill. In general, a group held
together only by a cartelistic objective is often thought to be fragile and
easily disrupted.1l 9 A powerful seller could disrupt such a group by
offering some participants secret discounts if they would defect. The
short-run gain to the defector would include getting a head start in
102. Baker, Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 101, at 638-46.
103. See Impact ofAntitrust Laws, supra note 79.
104. Id. at 82-83 (statement of David A. Balto).
105. Id. at 11 (statement of Del. Anthony Weiner, Member, H. Comm. on the Judic-
iary).
106. The argument draws strength by analogy from the exemptions given to farm
cooperatives and labor unions who engage in collective bargaining over prices or wages.
It is worth noting that unions are rapidly declining in the American economy which
suggests that they have not proven very effective means to achieve market power for
workers when facing strong buyers. Similarly, except where protected by a federally
enforced marketing order, it appears that farm cooperatives have not had much capacity
to generate higher prices for farmers via bargaining. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST
LAW, FEDERAL STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS FROM ANTITRUST LAW, 87-131 (2007).
107. See Devlin, supra note 10.
108. Id.
109. See John S. McGee, Ocean Freight Rate Conferences and the American
Merchant Marine, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 191, 201 (1960) (setting forth conditions for
successful cartelization).
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competing with the other members of the group in processing the input
and having saleable output. Thus, even if authorized, such cartels might
prove ineffective, as farmer cooperatives have been when they are not
supported by express government regulation that restricts competition."
0
From a dynamic perspective, the argument that a cartel is a reasonable
response to sellers' power assumes that the other alternative responses
such as creating a cooperative entity to compete in the area of market
power,"l ' sponsoring entry, or finding substitute inputs, are not viable
options over the long run. By focusing on the short run, the case for a
buyer cartel can emerge as a strong one because in the short run no other
alternative exists. 1 2 However, the fact that a monopolist is making
monopoly profits ought, over time, to induce entry or innovation that
reduces or avoids the need for the monopolized product. Hence, unless
there is a strong argument that the seller's power is not likely to dissipate
for a long period of time, the justification for a buyer cartel is weak. 1'
3
Finally, if there is a need for any countervailing, cartelistic power, then
there is a very serious concern with allowing private parties to engage in
such activities without ongoing public supervision. Thus, where public
policy saw monopoly or cartel organization as necessary for the selling
side of markets, it has usually provided for regulation of prices and
services. This is the history of railroads, airlines, natural gas, electricity,
10. See, e.g., WILLARD E. MUELLER, PETER G. HELMBERGER & THOMAS W.
PATERSON, THE SUNKIST CASE: A STUDY IN LEGAL-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 198-99 (1987)
(discussing Sunkist cooperative difficulties); VICTORIA SAKER WOESTE, THE FARMER'S
BENEVOLENT TRUST: LAW AND AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA
1865-1945, at 175-79 (1998) (discussing Sun-Maid cooperative difficulties).
111. For example, in the early 1900s when farm-to-market transportation was costly
and slow, farmers often faced monopoly grain buyers who exploited their power by
paying low prices relative to the prevailing market price for grain. In response, many
farmers organized cooperative elevators that provided a means to avoid the monopsony
bottleneck and facilitated sales into the large national market for grain. Because of the
cooperative organization, there was no incentive to exploit buyer power. See Peter C.
Carstensen, The Content of the Hollow Core of Antitrust: The Chicago Board of Trade
Case and the Meaning of the "Rule of Reason" in Restraint of Trade Analysis, in 15 RES.
L. & ECON. 1, 22-23 (Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. & Victor P. Goldberg eds., 1992).
112. Donald Baker has argued that the use of access rules should be limited on
networks because of the potential for creating competing networks. Donald I. Baker,
Compulsory Access to Network Joint Ventures Under the Sherman Act: Rules or
Roulette?, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 999, 1127-28. The same argument applies to other issues
in buyer power contexts.
113. In addition, a buyer cartel can result in coordination on the selling side of the
market if the buyers constitute a substantial part of the resale market as well. If that
occurs, the buyer cartel would morph into a seller cartel whose function is to raise price
and reduce output to the customers of its participants.
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insurance, and telecommunications. 114 To be sure, in all the foregoing
industries, more recent experience is that more competition provides a
better set of incentives than command and control regulation." 5 But in
these transforming industries, the central insight is that there is and ought
to be direct oversight of how those markets operate, often to the exclusion
of antitrust.116 Indeed, in some highly competitive markets, the courts have
decided that the regulatory regime necessary to assure the integrity of
those markets preempts antitrust law.' 17 Hence if there are inherent
obstacles in moving selling markets toward more competitive structure
and conduct such that a buyer cartel is the least worst option for
establishing equitable prices and services, then there ought to be an
appropriate public regulatory body to oversee that process since the
interests of private parties will not necessarily be congruent with the
public interest.
B. Buying Groups-Efficiency Gains and Competitive Risks
In the case of buying groups there are a number of efficiency
arguments that justify such organizations, but there are also some
competitive risks that frequently go unrecognized or unduly minimized.
1. Efficiency Gain from Buying Groups
A buying group can reduce transaction costs by using a single buyer to
obtain inputs. As long as the participants in the group require similar
inputs, the result can be a more efficient system. There are coordination
114. Both farmers through the Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (2006), and
labor unions through the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006), are
authorized to create cartels under limited conditions. Only rarely has this authority
provided significant benefit to the favored groups. See, e.g., ABA SECTION OF ANTI-
TRUST LAW, supra note 106, at 127-29 (discussing how farm cooperatives in general
have not achieved significant exploitation of the market with the possible exception of
some specialized crops and dairy where related legislation creates enforceable constraints
on entry and expansion of production).
115. See generally Peter C. Cartensen, Reflections on Mergers and Competition in
Formerly Regulated Industries, in COMPETITION POLICY AND MERGER ANALYSIS IN
DEREGULATED AND NEWLY COMPETITIVE INDUSTRIES 225, 226 (Peter C. Carstensen &
Susan Beth Farmer eds., 2008).
116. See, e.g., Verizon Commc'n Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398,412 (2004).
117. See, e.g., Credit Suisse Sec. (USA), LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 273-77 (2007)
(holding that securities law precludes antitrust claims where investment banks formed
syndicates to help execute IPOs for hundreds of technology related companies).
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issues, however. A centralized buying system must in some way marshal
orders and have a coordinated way to distribute the inputs among the
participants in the group as well as assure payment for those products.
Thus, depending on the scale of purchases and the range or variety of
inputs required, the participants may or may not find a buying group to be
useful. Indeed, where the only advantage of the group is savings in the
transactional and distributional dimensions, the market will provide a good
test for participants. For example, Northwest Wholesale Stationers, a
cooperative located in the Pacific Northwest, bought and warehoused a
variety of stationary store supplies and provided prompt delivery from its
warehouse to individual stores so that they got the advantages of the full
line of products readily available. 1 8 Thus, membership would be desirable
if the efficiency gains in the buying, transportation, warehousing, and
distribution of these products exceeded the costs of membership, including
any limitations on the variety of products available through the
cooperative, or any restraints on buying outside the group. 119 Other buying
groups for retailers exist and can provide all these functions or only those
that are more efficiently handled on a combined basis.'
20
A buying cooperative, however, also has the capacity to bargain for
prices. Contrary to the abstract model of competitive prices in which all
prices result from a market bidding process that results in a single price
known to all buyers and sellers, in a workably competitive market the
seller almost always has some discretion in setting price. 121 In particular, a
seller may find it attractive to lower prices slightly to gain a large order
that will ensure more efficient volume in the production facility. A buyer
seeking a large volume may itself do a better job of searching the market
for suppliers, therefore getting a more active bidding process as a result.
This suggests then, that in a market where competition is imperfect but
workable, buyers can gain price advantages by employing more
sophisticated and effective searches for the inputs they need. At the same
118. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery and Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,
286-87 (1985).
119. In order to obtain the economies of scale that are possible for buying groups they
may need to have their participants agree to focus some or all of their purchases on the
buyer group.
120. For example, Topco provides buying services, including quality control, and
coordinates the development of new products, but the grocery items are shipped directly
to the warehouse of the participating mid-sized chains or, in a few instances, wholesalers
serving smaller chains. See Topco.com, About Topco, http://www.topco.com/about.htm
(last visited Feb. 6, 2010). The gains to Topco's members come from the selective
coordination of services. Id.
121. See generally supra Part II.
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time, sellers can in fact profit from making larger sales at lower prices
when the transaction reduces selling costs and/or when the resulting
volume is itself a source of efficiency in the production process.
Hence, once it is appreciated that the market for most products has a
number of imperfections such that "perfect" competition is an irrelevant
abstraction, then the use of collective buying that marshals demand can
enhance efficiency with respect to the pricing of the goods in question.
Indeed, any system that moves a market process closer to the abstraction is
likely to have much the same effect. The use of internet business-to-
business venues where buyers can post their needs and sellers can respond
illustrates a different mechanism that can achieve comparable results
without any buyer collaboration. 122
2. The Competitive Risks from Buying Groups
By marshaling a significant share of the market for an input, a buying
group can also create a variety of competitive risks in both the upstream
supply market(s) and the downstream market(s) in which its participants
compete. The central economic fact is that as the volume of sales taken by
a single buyer increases, the power of that buyer over the suppliers also
increases. With increased power, the buyer can impose onerous conditions
on the sellers that directly affect the price paid, require restrictions on
access to the inputs that foreclose competitors in the buying market, and/or
use control of significant inputs to achieve coordination of competition in
the downstream market. The most obvious risk is that the buying group
will exploit its power to drive down prices below a competitive level. This
can occur whenever the group can exploit some subset of sellers who have
few alternatives, provided the buyers are willing to reduce output as
supply declines, have alternative sources of supply, or can employ "all or
nothing" contracts. The buying group gains economically whether the
reason for the lower prices is transactional efficiency, productive effic-
iency, or exploitation of a power buying position. Either way, the
pecuniary gain from the use of buyer power results in lower input costs to
the buyers.
A second related risk, illustrated in a number of cases, is the use of
buyer power to impose additional exclusions of competition. This is the
122. Of course, such sites also provide potential means to coordinate both input prices
and therefore stabilize output prices. The FTC has discussed some of these risks in its
report on these operations. FTC STAFF REPORT, ENTERING THE 21ST CENTURY:
COMPETITION POLICY IN THE WORLD OF B2B ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACES (Oct. 2000),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/10/b2breport.pdf.
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use that Broadway-Hale made of its power as an appliance buyer. 123 Toys
"R" Us imposed a similar type of restraint on its suppliers by requiring
that they not provide popular toys to low price, discount retailers that
competed with Toys "R" Us. 124 Such practices are of long standing, as
illustrated by two prominent Supreme Court cases.' 2 5 In context of a
legitimate buying group, such exclusionary conduct can take the form of
exclusive dealings or other comparable arrangements that preclude sales
of key inputs to competitors of the buyers. A somewhat less restrictive
option would be to demand "most favored nation" treatment that effect-
ively limits the capacity of the supplier to discount the input to other
buyers. 26 Again, this is not to suggest that in the context of a legitimate
buying group some restraints on the freedom of suppliers might not be
reasonable and essential to the efficient operation of the agreement. One
can imagine that, as the buyers obtained goods with greater differentiation,
they would be more concerned in retaining the rights to those products to
avoid risks of free-riding or other strategic conduct by either the producer
or competing buyers. 12 Hence, the challenge once again is to find a
reasonable basis to differentiate between the reasonably necessary rest-
raints and those that simply protect a group of powerful buyers from
threats of entry and competition in their downstream market.
Another risk that the Topco case illustrates is that of using the buying
group to allocate downstream markets or set resale prices. 2 8 Topco's
members used their annual meeting to allocate and re-allocate territory so
123. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 209 (1959).
124. Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 930-32 (7th Cir. 2000).
125. E. States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 606
(1914); Montague v. Lowery, 193 U.S. 38, 38 (1904).
126. The term "most favored nation" is borrowed from international trade agreements
that require participating countries to give the other participating country the same
treatment as the most favored country. In antitrust analysis, the term applies to any
contract that requires a seller to give the buyer the best price it has given any other buyer.
See Anthony J. Dennis, Most Favored Nation Contract Clauses Under the Antitrust
Laws, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 821, 822 (1995). This requirement usually includes a period
of time so that a buyer gets the benefit of any lower price charged in some succeeding
period of time, e.g., six months. For a fuller discussion of the topic, see LAWRENCE
ANTHONY SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED
HANDBOOK 446-449 (2000).
127. One hypothetical example would be a group that invested in research and
development to create an improved input. Having done so, it would be rational to insist
that the contract producer only provide that input to the group that had invested in and
taken the risks with respect to the innovative input.
128. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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that they could avoid competing with each other.129 There was no just-
ification for such a territorial allocation based on the legitimate activities
of Topco, which served its members by developing and buying house-
brand groceries. 130 It is unlikely the resulting territorial assignments
created a great amount of market power given the presence of other
grocery chains in those markets, but such an allocation of territories
among the most efficient group of retailers would come at a low cost
given that they had meetings for a number of other legitimate reasons, and
the expected gain of limiting or eliminating head-to-head competition was
greater than the costs associated with reaching these agreements.' 31
Because input costs are often a significant factor in the pricing of
downstream products, a buying group also provides a means to coordinate
such prices, create a culture of price stability and avoidance of
competition. Such consequences imply that the members of the group
have a significant position in the downstream markets such that they can
plausibly coordinate their prices. One important way that buying groups
can contribute to tacit price collusion is that they can reduce the number of
completely independent actors in the market. The buying group coord-
inates the input purchases of its members and so yields common costs for
them. If these costs are a substantial part of the total cost of the products
being sold, this assures the participants that they are all proceeding with
relatively uniform costs. If there are relatively few competitors not in the
group serving the downstream markets or if the other competitors are also
parts of comparable buying groups, it is more feasible to have tacit price
coordination than if all competitors were independently buying their
inputs.
Buyers can also bundle their input purchases in ways that may yield
pecuniary gain. For example, by bundling inputs with a high level of
competition with those over which the producer has significant market
power, the buying group may get favorable prices for the package. But the
economic cost is the lost opportunity for competing input suppliers in the
competitive market to get access to the opportunity to make sales. The
buyers may actually favor such a system because it can stabilize the
upstream market and so reduce the risk of a competitive input source
disrupting downstream competition that has become tacitly collusive. This
129. Id. at 601-03.
130. Carstensen & First, supra note 50, at 182-85.
131. See id. Topco still operates and is larger than ever, but now its members fieely
compete with each other. One important strategy that Topco now uses is creating retailer
specific house brands to avoid any concerns about strategic exploitation of prior
promotional investments.
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would be particularly attractive if the downstream market was charact-
erized by inelastic demand and informational or other asymmetries that
resulted in prices above current costs. Limiting entry into the upstream
input market would then serve the interest of the downstream producers
because it would reduce the risk of price or product competition breaking
out.
In the same vein, it is possible to imagine buying groups using their
power to discourage innovation in the input markets. New inputs might
require investment in a new plant or equipment and might alter the barriers
to entry. Using their buyer power to insist on limits to the kinds of
innovation that suppliers engage in would reduce the risk of that kind of
disruptive innovation from occurring. Here again, the point is not that such
conduct will occur or that it is likely to be effective in many market
contexts even if attempted. Rather, the point is that a legitimate buying
group having buyer power has an incentive to consider the full range of
ways in which its power can be used to protect its participants from the
risks of competition. Thus, this analysis motivates a policy conclusion that
even legitimate buying groups raise sufficient competitive risks to warrant
strict review.
If there are relatively few buyer groups active in an input market, they
can collectively, but not necessarily collusively, foreclose technological
competition in the input market if they all select the same supplier. This
will foreclose entry and indeed eliminate existing competition. The
resulting monopoly price from the supplier will force up downstream
prices, but the buyers, because of their buyer power, may be able to
bargain for a substantial share of that profit. An illustrative example
occurred in the automotive sandpaper market where a firm with a deep
pocket made very attractive long-term offers to buyers. 132 This forced out
the more poorly financed leading incumbent and ultimately resulted in
nearly 100 percent of the sales captured by the entrant.' 33 The excluded
competitor claimed that the entrant then shared a substantial part of its
projected monopoly profits with its buyers. 34 This of course created a
community of interest in which the buyers had no incentive to seek
competitive supplies so long as theyi collectively dominated the down-
stream retail market for this product.
132. NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 448-49 (6th Cir. 2007).
133. Id. at 447-49.
134. Id.
135. These effects, discussed in Klish, supra note 69, assume that the downstream
firms are not subject to easy competitive entry. In the sandpaper case, as in the case of
hospital supplies discussed by Klish, there is no incentive to make entry into the
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TV. CURRENT ANTITRUST POLICY ON BUYER GROUPS
A. Buyer Cartels
Contemporary antitrust policy is that buyer cartels are per se illegal
and are often treated as criminal offenses. 136 This is true even if the buyers
could make a plausible showing that they are acting together to counteract
seller monopoly or oligopoly power. The rational for this absolute prohib-
ition is the impossibility of differentiating between legitimate efforts to
create countervailing power and collusive efforts to exploit buyer power.
The potential unfairness of this absolute policy is offset by the fact that
Congress has shown itself willing to grant antitrust exemptions for a few
situations where buyer power is a major source of concern. Thus labor
unions can engage in collective bargaining on an industry-wide basis in
order to redress some of the great buyer power that employers have.' 37 Of
course, to take advantage of this authorization, employees must decide that
belonging to a union with the resulting costs and limitations will be worth
the benefits. Similar exemptions exist for farm cooperatives and
fishermen's joint efforts to withstand buyer power.' 38 It is notable that the
focus in all these cases is on sellers facing buyer power and not on buyers
needing power. But recently, the independent pharmacies sought to get a
statute permitting them to create a buyers' cartel. 139 However, that effort
did not succeed in the face of strong opposition from the Department of
Justice, among others.14
0
In the cases of labor, agriculture, and fishing, however, the results
have been disappointing from the perspective of countervailing power.
Workers have been reluctant to join unions, and employers have been
effective in discouraging unionization. In agriculture, low barriers to entry
downstream market only to market the specific product. Hence, the buyers-resellers can
gain significant monopoly profits from such sales. A more general model of this conduct
is found in Doyle & Han, supra note 34.
136. See Vogel v. Am. Soc'y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 601 (7th Cir. 1984)
("[B]uyer cartels, the object of which is to force the prices that suppliers charge the
members of the cartel below the competitive level, are illegal per se.").
137. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006).
138. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (2006) (exemption for farm cooperatives); 15 U.S.C. § 521 (2006)
(fishing cooperatives).
139. See supra note 79.
140. See, e.g., Impact of Antitrust Laws, supra note 79, at 53-76 (statement of David
Wales, Deputy Director, Bureau of Competition, FTC) (stating the Commission's
opposition to a buyers' cartel for independent pharmacies because it threatens to raise
prices to consumers).
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and the inherent openness of farm cooperatives have limited their capacity
to raise prices above prevailing market levels. 14 1 In the case of fishermen,
courts have construed the statute in such a manner as to render the statute
largely useless. 142 Given the weakness of any pure cartel arrangement and
its vulnerability to selective action by the buyers or sellers on the other
side, it is probable that if a group of buyers really need bargaining power,
they need to do more than collude to insist upon lower prices. 1
43
The examples of labor, farming, and fishing as well as the pharmacy
claim all involve efforts to create overt agreements with antitrust
immunity. These cases all involve very large groups of actors with diverse
interests and motivations. In an earlier era, the pharmacies did act as a
group to use their buyer power to coerce over the counter drug producers
to create and enforce resale price maintenance. 144 Other comparable
retailer groups lacked the internal cohesion to impose similar restraints in
the gasoline and grocery retailing industry. 145
These observations are suggestive that the parameters of buyer cartels
may be different from those found in seller cartels. Indeed, the incentives
to create and adhere to a buyer cartel are significantly different from those
in a seller cartel. Defection by a seller from a price fixing or market
allocating cartel results in a direct and immediate increase in sales and
revenue. This is economically rational when the seller projects that its
profits in the short run will exceed whatever reaction will subsequently
occur. In contrast, a defecting buyer faces basically higher prices as it bids
up input prices in order to achieve a larger volume of production. Larger
production, however, means that the volume in the market into which the
product will resell will also increase. Hence, the product faces higher input
141. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 106, at 107-10; see also
MUELLER, HELMBERGER & PATTERSON, supra note 110.
142. See Jonathan H. Adler, Conservation Through Collusion: Antitrust as an Obstacle
to Marine Resource Conservation, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 3 (2004). But some evidence
of other government sponsored collective efforts have resulted in more conservation and
indirectly facilitated fishermen in obtaining better prices for their catches. Id. at 41-49.
143. The intuition is that if a group of buyers face a powerful seller, the seller can
break up the buyer cartel by offering discounts to selected buyers. The further assumption
is that there are many buyers and a single dominant seller. In such a situation the
argument for a buyer cartel is most powerful as a source of countervailing power. But,
given many buyers, the risk of defection by a sufficient number of buyers to cause the
cartel to become ineffective is a strong possibility since the only link among the buyers is
their individual interest in lower prices.
144. PALAMOuNTAIN, supra note 36, at 238-39 (discussing how when Pepsodent
sought to eliminate resale price maintenance in California, the retail druggists essentially
boycotted all of Pepsodent's products until Pepsodent restored RPM).
145. See generally id.
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prices and constant or lower resale prices. Even so, it is possible that the
marginal increase in costs will be more than offset by the opportunity to
make more sales at slightly lower prices. This two step process of gaining
from defection, however, means that there are greater incentives to remain
loyal to the conspiracy. 1
46
Some courts have recognized the implications of this analysis and
allowed cases to proceed against alleged buying cartel schemes when the
number of participants and their arguably different interests would make a
seller cartel implausible. One illustrative case is Todd v. Exxon Corp., in
which the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant oil and gas companies
shared detailed information about job descriptions and wage scales in
order to stabilize and restrain competition for skilled engineers and other
workers in the oil and gas industry. 147 The Second Circuit, in reversing
summary judgment against the plaintiffs, focused on the common
incentive of the participants to control wages and not engage in
competition for workers. 4 8 In this example, supply may well have been
moderately elastic and the gain to the employer from hiring any particular
potential employee very minor. Hence, the incentive to defect from such
an understanding would be very limited, and common interest in reducing
wage costs would allow firms with relatively disparate interests to
cooperate with a shared expectation of loyalty to the scheme.
The implications of recognizing that tacit and secret collusion may be
more rational and less vulnerable to opportunistic behavior by the
participants has significant implications for antitrust policy. First, it would
suggest that courts should be more hesitant to reject buyer side conspiracy
theories based on arguments that large numbers and diverse economic
goals make collusion implausible. 149 Second, it means that public enforce-
ment of antitrust law should look critically at buyer side information
exchanges' 50 because those can facilitate the creation and enforcement of
naked restraints on competition on the buyer side when such a claim
would be questionable with respect to comparable information sharing
among competing sellers. 151 These questions are explored further in the
146. See Marshall & Meurer, supra note 43, at 85.
147. 275 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2001).
148. Id. at 208-09.
149. Thus, applying the stricter pleading standards of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007), should not result in dismissal of complaints charging
collusion merely because a selling side conspiracy involving many parties or a wide
range of economic interests would be implausible.
150. See Amitai Aviram & Avishalom Tor, Overcoming Impediments to Information
Sharing, 55 ALA. L. REv. 231,231-34 (2004).
151. Gregory J. Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion:
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next part.
There is a counter concern with too easy an inference of collusion. In
some contexts, conduct may be rational unilateral conduct, but all or most
firms in an industry engage in the same conduct. 152 This consciously
parallel conduct would not create an inference of collusion unless there is
a basis to conclude that the conduct only made sense if engaged in
collectively. 153 The parallel behavior of a set of leading high tech firms in
refusing to solicit the employees of other such firms to switch employers
is an illustration. 154 There are some plausible unilateral reasons for such
conduct, but it also reduces the risk of competing on salary and benefits
for a set of workers with similar skills. Such competition likely would
raise the average wage level and, over time, probably would leave the
companies with roughly similar sets of workers. Hence, there is a clear
incentive not to engage in competition for the services of such workers.
B. Buying Groups
Although buying cartels are per se illegal and, as noted above, tacit
collusion among buyers is plausible under a wider range of business
situations than is the case with seller conspiracies, the current antitrust law
provides a broad tolerance for any enterprise that holds itself out as a
buying group, even when the group takes a large share of the input market.
The Antitrust Division guidelines for health care provide a "safety zone"
for any buying group that takes less than 35 percent of the sales in the
input market.' 5 Thus, such an input market could have as few as three
buying groups and still not raise antitrust concerns under those guidelines.
The case law is dispersed and not well focused on the issue of the
reasonableness of buying groups as such. The case most on-point is
Reconciling Antitrust Law With Oligopoly Theory, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 719, 779 (2004).
152. See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Economic Authority and the Limits of
Expertise in Antitrust Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 617, 677-79 (2005) (discussing courts'
unwillingness to infer tacit collusion without evidence of certain plus factors thus
excluding the possibility that defendants "engaged in lawful conscious parallelism").
153. Brian Thomas Fitzsimons, Note, The Injustice of Notice & Heightened Pleading
Standards for Antitrust Conspiracy Claims: It Is Time to Balance the Scale for Plaintiffs,
Defendants, and Society, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 199, 209 n.39 (2007) (listing common "plus
factors").
154. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 2.
155. See Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Enforcement
Policy in Health Care: Statement of Enforcement Policy on Joint Purchasing Arrange-
ments Among Health Care Providers 1 (1996), http://www.ftc.gov/bc/healthcare/industry
guide/policy/statement7.pdf.
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Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationary, in which the
plaintiffs theory was that because the organization did not adhere to
appropriate procedures for excluding the plaintiff, there was a per se
violation of the antitrust law.' 56 In reversing the Ninth Circuit, which had
accepted that theory, 157 the Court emphasized that this buying group was a
private economic venture that was not required to have any specific
process for excluding its members.' 58 The Court also concluded that the
case could continue on a rule of reason basis if the plaintiff could allege
that either the refusal to deal itself was pretextual (i.e., that it was in
furtherance of an anticompetitive conspiracy of the membership), or that
the venture had market power in the upstream office supply market such
that participation was essential to the economic survival of the retailers of
such goods. 159 Interestingly, the case history contains no record after
remand, suggesting that on remand, the plaintiff apparently could not
sustain either theory and the case disappeared. 16 In praising the buying
group, the Supreme Court focused on its potential efficiency as a buyer
and the potential effect of exclusion on the capacity to compete in the
downstream market for office supplies. Thus, like Topco, an earlier buying
group case, there was no attention to the potential competitive
implications of the buying group as a buyer.' 6' One might then infer from
these cases that the only competitive risk raised by buying groups is that
they can affect downstream competition. However, as discussed earlier,
156. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,
288 (1985).
157. The theory had its origins in Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 347-48,
364-65 (1963), where the Court condemned the Exchange's ordering of its members not
to deal with Silver without according Silver any opportunity to hear or respond to the
charges against him. The Exchange had a statutory duty to oversee the ethics and
behavior of its members and those with whom those members traded. Hence, the
Exchange was acting as a publicly authorized regulatory organization (i.e., it was a self-
regulatory organization). As such, the Exchange had an obligation to provide an
appropriate process to determine whether an individual should be excluded from trading
with its member firms. Thus, the case involved a very different type of refusal to deal.
For a fuller discussion of the case, see generally Peter C. Carstensen & Bette Roth, The
Per Se Legality of Some Naked Restraints: A (Re)Conceptualization of the Antitrust
Analysis of Cartelistic Organizations, 45 ANTITRUST BULL. 349 (2000).
158. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 289-93.
159. Id. at 296-97 & n.7.
160. Neither Westlaw nor the CCH Trade Cases contains a report of any decision after
the Supreme Court remand.
161. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). Like Topco, Northwest
Wholesale Stationers does not appear to have been a major buyer of office supplies in
what was at least a national, and perhaps international, market. See generally Nw.
Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 284.
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buying groups can impose a variety of adverse, competitive effects on
both upstream suppliers and competing buyers. 162 Yet, the overall sense is
that there is a strong presumption of legality with respect to conduct and
practices toward suppliers for most groups that claim to be a buying
group. Given the lack of comprehensive data, it is difficult to discern
whether this is a result of a lack of challenges or because cases involving
such issues have emphasized other concerns, leaving the upstream effects
under-discussed. The current inventory of illustrative cases comes largely
from standard-setting organizations that are collective buyers of key
technology licenses, and athletics, both amateur and professional.
One area where the issues of buyer power have emerged in several
cases involves the creation of standards using patented components.' 63 The
standard-setters offer to take a single patented component and include it in
the standard. 164 This gives the collective buyer a strong bargaining
position as long as the buyers have choices for their standard and are
aware of the intellectual property rights claimed by a producer. 165 In that
context, two problems can arise: (1) depressed prices below a reasonable
competitive level, and (2) abuse of the buying power to favor the
technology of insiders. The first risk is probably of a low order since, by
definition, the seller has a strong argument if its technology is the
preferred option. The result is a bargaining process in which there is
unlikely to be a clearly "correct" price. Indeed, except in the patent hold-
up cases where the concern is the exploitation of patent rights disclosed
only after the standard was adopted, 1 6 there appears to be little concern
about this issue.
Exclusionary decisions, in contrast, have resulted in a moderate
amount of litigation. Here the concern is that the purchase has an inherent
exclusionary effect in terms of the standard being created and, therefore,
has a significant impact on the economic results of individual firms.
In amateur athletics, the dominant organization for college sports is the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). It is more of a
regulatory agency with de facto authorization to control some aspects of
162. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Beyond Per Se, Rule of Reason or Merger Analysis: A
New Antitrust Standard for Joint Ventures, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1, 40 (1991).
163. See generally J. Gregory Sidak, Patent Holdup and Oligopsonistic Collusion in
Standard-Setting Organizations, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & EcoN. 123 (2009), available at
http://jcle.oxfordjoumals.org/cgi/reprint/5/1 /123.pdf.
164. Id. at 124.
165. See, e.g., id. at 126.
166. See, e.g., In re Union Oil Co. of Cal., 140 F.T.C. 123 (July 27, 2005). The Federal
Trade Commission's 2005 opinion reinstating the case is available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/adjpro/d9305/040706commissionopinion.pdf.
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college sports than it is a true joint venture. 67 Nevertheless, many
observers regard it as a joint venture that produces college athletics. Its
participants are "buyers" of college-age athletes, and the NCAA's role is
to regulate the buyers in that market. But it has also sought to regulate a
number of other ways in which colleges might compete on the buying
side. These regulations serve to control the overall costs of producing
athletic programs and therefore increase the gain (or reduce the loss) to the
members. Although imposing low salaries on college athletes and related
restraints on their freedom have been upheld, 168 the NCAA's effort to
restrict salaries for assistant coaches in basketball was struck down as an
illegal restraint.' 
69
In the case of professional football, the courts have on several
occasions struck down as unreasonable specific practices affecting the
market for player services.1 70 On the other hand, entry and some compen-
sation rules have been upheld as aspects of labor-management relations
shielded from antitrust law by the labor exemption.' 71 Still, those cases
also illustrate how the buyers have used their power to affect the market
for player services, even if the specific conduct was not reviewable under
the antitrust laws. Baseball, although exempt from antitrust law, 172 has
experienced similar concerns for abuse of buyer power. 173
167. See Carstensen & Roth, supra note 157, at 402-08.
168. See, e.g., Smith v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 139 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir.
1998) (holding Sherman Act inapplicable to NCAA eligibility requirements). In football
and many other college sports, there are naked restraints on college athletes. The case of
basketball is more complex because all teams adhering to the payment constraints are
eligible to participate in post-season tournaments. Id. Thus, the NCAA's regulation of
college sports is more in the tradition of the New York Stock Exchange's regulation of
the ethics of its members and their trading partners that was the focus of the Silver case
than the joint ventures that constitute most of America's professional league sports. For a
fuller development of the regulatory exemption from antitrust's condemnation of cartels,
see Carstensen & Roth, supra note 157.
169. Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1024 (10th Cir. 1998).
170. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1188-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(holding NFL draft in its 1968 form unreasonably restrained trade); Mackey v. Nat'l
Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 617 (8th Cir. 1976) (citing cases applying Sherman Act
to restraints on competition for players' services).
171. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 234-35 (1996).
172. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972); Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v.
Nat'l League of Prof 1 Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922) (holding baseball was
not commerce as the term was understood at that time). The holding has come to be
interpreted as exempting baseball from antitrust law.
173. The Curt Flood Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2006), limits this exemption with respect to
treatment of players. See also BRAD SNYDER, A WELL-PAID SLAVE: CURT FLOOD'S
FIGHT FOR FREE AGENCY IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 2-3 (2006).
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Congressional hearings have focused on the potential for abuse of
buying power in hospital supplies.174 The competitive problems that were
identified first involved foreclosure of potential competition in the supply
market resulting from bundling and requirements contracts that limited the
freedom of hospitals to accept attractive alternatives. Second, the organ-
izers of these buying groups appeared to have made very large profits on
the purchase and resale of supplies to the hospitals.
A similar problem unfolded in the insurance industry.1 75 Again the
source of anticompetitive harm was the role of insurance agents
specializing in handling large firm policy purchases.' 76 The relatively few
agents engaging in this specialized business each controlled a sufficient
volume of insurance purchases that they were able to compel insurers to
accept a market allocation scheme promoted by the agents in which the
insurers rigged bids and then shared the resulting overcharges with the
agents. 1
77
Thus, despite the common view that most buying groups are lawful
with respect to their upstream activities, 178 the reality is that when the
courts have made more focused inquiry, the results are a more critical
evaluation of the resulting restraints. However, these episodic inter-
ventions have not led to a more calibrated standard for evaluating buyer
groups. Many scholars of a variety of ideological perspectives seem to
share this benign view of buyer groups.' 79 These scholars seem to have
focused only on the positive part of buying groups and ignored the
potential for a variety of downsides that they might create for competition.
V. RETHINKING ANTITRUST POLICY
Two areas of antitrust law as they relate to buyer cartels and buyer
groups need thoughtful reappraisal today. First, there is greater potential
for tacit and loose conspiracy to create buyer cartels than the current law
recognizes. Second, buyer groups, when they have more than a modest
share of the input market, can in fact raise serious competitive issues.
174. See Hospital Group Purchasing: Lowering Costs at the Expense of Patient Health
and Medical Innovation?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Business Rights,
and Competition of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002), available at http:
//www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG- 1 07shrg899/pdf/CHRG- 107shrg899.pdf.
175. See Lozano, supra note 47.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., Jacobson & Dorman, supra note 6, at 23, 40.
179. E.g., id.; Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 11, at 192, 196, 234; see also,
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, supra note 155.
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A third topic has been explored already and motivates a third concern.
Investigators need to distinguish carefully between cartelistic buying
arrangements and ones that are legitimate buying groups. At the margin it
is going to be very difficult to tell the difference. Hence, some rules of
thumb based on market share are in fact plausible, but as repeatedly
pointed out in the preceding discussion, the current level for such a
presumption is much too generous.
A. The Potential for Buyer Side Conspiracy
The general paucity of buyer side cases stands in stark contrast to data
from merger analysis which shows that the most significant cost savings
comes from reduction in input costs.' 80 This would suggest that there is the
substantial potential for price-affecting conspiracies among competing
buyers. Indeed, there are a number of examples in the beef-processing
market of tacitly conclusive conduct among the three or four major buyers
that resulted in significantly depressed prices. 181
In addition to looking more critically at interdependent buying
practices, it is also important to consider the kinds of remedies that might
be practical from a judicial perspective. This is an issue especially in tacit
collusion contexts where the industry structure is such that some
interdependence in buying decisions is largely unavoidable. But it is often
possible to increase the transparency of buying practices that facilitate
such collusion.1 82 Remedies focused on eliminating such practices will not
180. C. Edward Fee & Shawn Thomas, Sources of Gains in Horizontal Mergers:
Evidence from Customer, Supplier, and Rival Firms, 74 J. FIN. ECON. 423, 424-27
(2004). Consistent with that observation, other scholars have found substantial losses to
sellers resulting from buyer cartels. See John E. Kwoka, Jr., The Price Effects of Bidding
Conspiracies: Evidence from Real Estate Auction "Knockouts," 42 ANTITRUST BULL.
503, 503 (1997) (finding a 32 percent price decrease resulted from bid-rigging in real
estate auctions); Jon P. Nelson, Comparative Antitrust Damages in Bid-Rigging Cases:
Some Findings from a Used Vehicle Auction, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 369, 386 tbl.4, 392-94
(1993) (finding a significant price decrease resulted from bid-rigging in auctions for used
police cars).
181. R-CALF, an advocacy group for farmers raising beef, has provided a detailed
analysis of how buyer power works in that industry. Its submission in connection with the
JBS-National and Smithfield beef merger contains detailed assertions of how beef buyers
manipulated the prices for fed cattle. Concentration in Agriculture and an Examination of
the JBS/SWIFT Acquisition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition
Policy and Consumer Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 131-65 (2008)
(statement of Bill Bullard, CEO, Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Fund, United
Stockgrowers of Americer).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 28228, 1977 WL 1475, at *3-4
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entirely eliminate the potential for tacit collusion, especially given the fact
that defection is much less likely in buyer side tacit collusion. However, it
can increase the potential for more competition among buyers to secure
important inputs.
In certain markets, market conduct regulation already exists. This is
true in some vulnerable agricultural commodity markets. In such markets,
the demonstration of serious tacit collusion problems ought to lead to
market facilitating regulation that make it more difficult for the buyers to
collude. Admittedly, this has not happened as of yet because of the
political influence of the large buyers. But there are proposals that could
limit both strategic buying and other practices that frustrate the comp-
etitive process.
B. Stricter Review of the Competitive Impact of Buyer Groups
The second important insight, that the evaluation of competitive risks
presented by legitimate buying groups contributes to forward looking
policies, is that there ought to be closer scrutiny of such groups because of
their potential to create anticompetitive effects in both upstream and
downstream markets. The current policy of a strong presumption of
legality if a group has some formal characteristics of a legitimate joint
venture and has a market share in the buying market below a very
generous threshold results in a policy that runs serious risks of "false
positives.
'' 83
The literature of buyer power confirmed in part by the reported cases
suggests that such power arises at market shares well below the current
thresholds.184 Indeed, in some recent health care cases the government
itself has objected to mergers or acquisitions where the post-merger share
of the input market was below the guideline threshold set forth in the
health care guidelines.' 85 Other analyses have, in particular, pointed to the
hospital supply markets as ones that have experienced significant exclus-
ionary effects as a result of large buying groups.'
86
The hard task for antitrust evaluation of such organizations is that they
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 1977). The GE-Westinghouse consent degree that eliminated inter-
dependent pricing of electrical equipment is a model.
183. Thomas A. Lambert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1688,
1698-99 (2005).
184. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
185. Botti, supra note 3, at 11 (discussing DOJ challenge to the merger of United
Health and PacifiCare).
186. See Klish, supra note 69, at 176.
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can and do serve legitimate functions that facilitate the efficient working
of the competitive process. Thus, the challenge is to have some screens or
filters that allow investigation to focus on those buying groups that are
most likely to raise competitive concerns.
The first screen ought to be the share of the input market being taken
by the buying group. Moreover, there needs to be a distinct calibration of
the scale that creates concerns on the buying side rather than a mere
extension of rules of thumb drawn from the selling side. In general, if the
buying group is taking more than a modest percentage of the output in the
relevant market, say 15 percent or more, there are real risks of exploitation
and. so the buying arrangement should be carefully examined to ensure
that it is in fact legitimate and that its buying practices do not impose
unnecessary limits on the competitive process.
The second screen ought to be an evaluation of the input market itself.
A rough estimate of the elasticity of supply and the barriers to exit on the
supply side are important criteria. When supply is inelastic and there are
constraints on expanding or contracting output, there are greater potentials
for anticompetitive conduct exploiting suppliers.
The effect of this shift in perspective on buying groups is that, like
contemporary merger analysis, the structural fact of market share would
create a need to look carefully at how the specific group operates
including its buying practices as well as whether it might facilitate
downstream coordination among its participants or achieve exclusion of
competitors. These issues are currently recognized in the health care
guidelines which are the only ones that speak very directly to buying
groups. 187 The key difference between the very tolerant view of those
guidelines and this analysis is that it argues that the competitive risks are
greater and the potential for their occurring arises at lower levels of market
concentration than contemporary policy would suggest.
Finally, the scope and range of scale economies in the supply market
are a final screen. When there are such economies, there are both
incentives for legitimate efficiency enhancing transactions and for
anticompetitive use of control over the volume of business necessary to
achieve scale economy. In such situations, the key competitive risk resides
in exclusionary agreements that foreclose competitors of the buying group
from gaining access to the output of the larger scale producers.
Ultimately, the goal of these three screens is to focus inquiry onto the
kinds of buyer groups that contain the most risk of anticompetitive
conduct. Even then, the goal should not be to eliminate an efficiency-
187. See Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, supra note 155 at 1-2.
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enhancing buyer group because it creates risks of anticompetitive conduct,
but rather, to focus on the ways to avoid or reduce the risks of such
conduct. Topco is an illustration.' 88 The venture was prohibited from
engaging in market allocation, but continued to survive and prosper
because its members found its other services very valuable.' 8 9 These
screens then provide the basis to identify the kinds of buying groups that
most merit review.
CONCLUSION
Both legitimate buying groups and buyers' cartels present serious
challenges to maintaining a strong and viable competitive process. Despite
occasional plausible arguments to create countervailing buyer power, the
demands of a workable competitive process preclude the courts from
accepting any such justification as a defense. Hence, on their merits, naked
restraints of competition by buyers must be absolutely illegal. In addition,
the incentives of buyers are likely to make tacit collusion more feasible
and attractive to larger groups of buyers than are ordinarily found in seller
side cartels. Thus, enforcement authorities ought to look more broadly at
the impact of parallel buying practices especially in markets with
relatively few buyers and many sellers.
In contrast to naked restraints of competition by buyers, legitimate
buying groups provide transactional efficiency as well as some negotiating
capacity that individual small volume buyers lack. As such they can make
a real contribution to the overall competitive process. However, given the
different ways in which such groups can be constituted that run the range
from substantial integration of buying services to very limited agency, it is
hard sometimes to differentiate between legitimate joint buying ventures
and naked restraints of buyer competition. For this reason, it is not
irrational to create a market share screen to help identify the kinds of
arrangements, whether legitimate or not, that merit further review. Thus,
the general thrust of current enforcement is appropriate, but it uses a
market share derived from seller side analogies that are far too generous
given the different capacity of buyer groups to impose harms on both
upstream and downstream markets. Ultimately, what is likely to be most
helpful is a set of guidelines for buying groups generally derived from
those already in use for the health care industry that provide guidance to
those organizing such groups so that they can avoid the kinds of practices
188. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
189. Carstensen & First, supra note 50, at 201-02.
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that are most likely to adversely effect competition.
The final but important point that this examination has emphasized is
that buying side issues are more pervasive and significant for competition
than contemporary policy makers have acknowledged. Indeed, the
preoccupation with "consumer" interests, however defined, has led to a
disproportionate focus on the selling side of the market and an under
appreciation of the risks to sellers when buyers collude. It is time to re-
strike the balance and emphasize more fully the need for careful review of
buyer side conduct.
